Population ageing in Scotland:Time for a re-think? by Spijker, Jeroen & MacInnes, John
  
 
 
 
Edinburgh Research Explorer 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Population ageing in Scotland
Citation for published version:
Spijker, J & MacInnes, J 2013, 'Population ageing in Scotland: Time for a re-think?' Scottish Affairs, vol 85.
Link:
Link to publication record in Edinburgh Research Explorer
Document Version:
Publisher final version (usually the publisher pdf)
Published In:
Scottish Affairs
Publisher Rights Statement:
© Spijker, J., & MacInnes, J. (2013). Population ageing in Scotland: Time for a re-think?. Scottish Affairs, 85.
General rights
Copyright for the publications made accessible via the Edinburgh Research Explorer is retained by the author(s)
and / or other copyright owners and it is a condition of accessing these publications that users recognise and
abide by the legal requirements associated with these rights.
Take down policy
The University of Edinburgh has made every reasonable effort to ensure that Edinburgh Research Explorer
content complies with UK legislation. If you believe that the public display of this file breaches copyright please
contact openaccess@ed.ac.uk providing details, and we will remove access to the work immediately and
investigate your claim.
Download date: 20. Feb. 2015
Scottish Affairs, no. 85, autumn 2013 
53 
POPULATION AGEING IN SCOTLAND: TIME 
FOR A RE-THINK? 
Jeroen Spijker and John MacInnes  
INTRODUCTION 
The first results from the 2011 Census show that, for the first time ever, there 
were more people aged 65 or over in Scotland than there were children aged 
under 15. A century ago people aged 65 or over represented about one in 
twenty of the population. Today their share is around one in six. Indeed the 
share of the population aged 80 or over is not far off the proportion represented 
by those aged 65 a century ago (see Figure 1). The share of the very oldest has 
also expanded, albeit from a small base, so that the number of men aged over 
90 has risen by a half over the last decade, while the number of women aged 
90+ has expanded more modestly, by just over one in six. The improvement for 
women has been less, simply because their slightly greater life expectancy 
meant that there were already more women living into their nineties in Scotland 
before the turn of this century. 
                                                          
 
 Jeroen Spijker and John MacInnes are in the Sociology Department at the University 
of Edinburgh. Jeroen Spijker is also vising scholar at the Centre d’Estudis 
Demogràfics, Spain. The research on which this paper is based was carried out as part 
of ESRC grant no ES/K004611/1 ‘Flexible aging: new ways to measure and explore 
the diverse experience of population aging in Scotland, using the Scottish Longitudinal 
Study’. The authors also thank the two anonymous referees for their useful comments. 
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Figure 1 
Scotland 1911-2011 Resident population on census day by age group 
 
Source: National Records of Scotland ‘2011 Census in Scotland: Population Estimates 
for Scotland- Release 1A, December 2012’. Available at 
http://www.scotlandscensus.gov.uk/documents/censusresults/release1a/rel1asb.
pdf 
This growth in the number of older people has created concern about 
‘population ageing’: the process whereby low fertility and decreasing mortality 
give rise to changes in the age structure of the population within which older 
people form an ever increasing proportion of the total (see Figures 1 and 2). 
Given the projected increase in the number and proportion of elderly in the UK 
(for Scotland, see National Records of Scotland, 2011), these concerns have 
been expressed by commentators, the UK and Scottish governments as well as 
social scientists. While the press has been inclined to spread consternation (e.g. 
The Economist, 2004; Daily Record, 2012; The Herald 2012; 2013a; 
2013b), governments have generally been more cautious, although perhaps less 
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so over pensions (e.g. The Scottish Government Finance Committee, Burnside, 
2012; House of Lords Select Committee on Public Service and Demographic 
Change 2013; Department of Work and Pensions, 2006). Some academic 
researchers have viewed the effects of population ageing as a mixture of 
positive and negative (Shaw, 2002; Raeside and Khan, 2008) while others have 
been more pessimistic. Wright (2002) even predicted a considerable reduction 
in overall living standards if the challenges of population ageing were not met. 
In summary, popular concerns regarding the process of population ageing exist 
for at least six reasons (see also Shaw, 2002):  
1. for every productive worker in employment there will be a rising 
number of older dependent citizens; 
2. as this ratio increases so will the cost of social insurance and 
welfare systems to working taxpayers increase; 
3. the growing elderly population will increase the health and social 
care systems costs; 
4. as the working population ages, there is the risk that less ‘new 
blood’ will bring with it less innovation, experimentation, risk-
taking and general dynamism; 
5. the political system will shift towards the representation of the 
interests of the old at their expense of the young; 
6. all these trends appear irreversible since mortality may be 
expected to continue to fall.  
Immigration is a purely temporary solution, as immigrants themselves will 
grow older. Thus Coleman (2002) and Holzmann (2005) have shown that 
halting changes in the population age structure as life expectancy increases 
soon require levels of immigration many times the size of the original 
population of a country. Although demographers have less often noted that 
much the same can be said for fertility, David Attenborough (2011) 
recently pointed out, quite correctly, that boosting fertility in a Canute-like 
attempt to avoid population ageing would be like a giant Ponzi scheme: it 
could work only if fertility could be continually accelerated to offset the 
rising number of older people that higher fertility would itself eventually 
produce. Thus many states are now considering such measures as rises in 
the age at which people can retire from work, or changes in pensions and 
social security arrangements in order to address the challenges of 
population ageing.  
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Figure 2 
Age structure of the Scottish population. 1981 vs. 2011 
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Source: GROS (2012). Mid-year Population Estimates; Scotland by quinary age and 
sex: 1911 to 2011. http://www.gro-
scotland.gov.uk/statistics/theme/population/estimates/mid-year/time-series.html.  
However it seems to us that these ‘solutions’ may address a problem that does 
not exist in the terms routinely stated. The trouble begins with the metaphor 
itself and the loose thinking it seems to encourage. Unlike persons, populations 
neither ‘age’ nor die. What does change is the age structure of the population, 
as fertility and mortality change. That is why populations, as measured by their 
mean or median ages, can get ‘younger’ as well as ‘older’: something which 
persons, alas, can never do. Indeed, as we shall see, it can sometimes make 
most sense to see populations as simultaneously getting older and more 
youthful. 
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A few moments’ reflection should lead us to ponder how it can be that what 
has been perhaps the greatest human achievement of the last century – the 
dramatic reduction of mortality across all ages, from infant to ‘oldest-old’ – has 
come to be seen as a problem! People in developing countries can now expect 
to live longer than those in the affluent West did as recently as the 1950s 
(Figure 3). Over the course of the twentieth century mean world life 
expectancy probably doubled. Population ageing is ultimately driven by much 
longer lives: it is a good, perhaps the best, thing. 
Figure 3 
Life expectancy at birth, women. Scotland and world regions. 1950-2015 
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Source: World and macro regions: UNDESA Population Division (2013). World Population 
Prospects: The 2012 Revision. http://esa.un.org/wpp/. Scotland until 1980: General Register 
Office for Scotland (2012). Scottish Interim Life Tables. Table 1. Expectation of life, by sex and 
selected age, Scotland, 1861 to 2011. http://www.gro-scotland.gov.uk/. Scotland After 1980: 
Office for National Statistics (2012). Period and cohort life expectancy tables, 2010-based. Table 
A1: 2010-based period expectation of life, 1981-2060, Principal Projection, Scotland. 
http://www.ons.gov.uk/ons/publications/re-reference-tables.html?edition=tcm%3A77-227587. 
Data points for Scotland are 1950-2, 1960-2, 1970-2, 1977 and every subsequent 5 years. 
THE JANUS FACE OF POPULATION AGEING 
It is well known that rising life expectancy (or what amounts to the same thing, 
falling mortality) changes the age structure of populations. A useful simple 
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measure of this is the median age of population members. The median age of a 
population is obtained by ranking all of its members by their age and selecting 
the age of the middle person in the ranking. Half of the population will be 
younger and half will be older. Using this measure the median age of the 
Scottish population in 1950 was 32.6. The impact of the baby boom largely 
offset improvements to life expectancy, so that for thirty years, the median age 
of the Scottish population changed little. However from around 1980 onwards, 
median age increased rapidly to reach 41 years by 2009, as shown in the first 
column of Table 1.  
Table 1 
Scotland: Median age and life expectancy at median age. 1950 – 2009 
 Median Age Life expectancy at Median Age 
Prospective Median 
Age* 
1950 32.6 38.6 32.6 
1955 33.2 38.8 32.3 
1960 33.4 39.1 32.0 
1965 33.2 39.5 31.5 
1970 32.9 40.1 30.9 
1975 32.6 41.0 29.9 
1980 33.2 41.0 30.0 
1985 34.4 40.4 30.6 
1990 35.3 40.5 30.5 
1995 36.4 40.3 30.7 
2000 38.1 39.7 31.4 
2005 39.9 39.0 32.1 
2009 41.1 39.1 32.0 
Source: Human Mortality Database. www.mortality.org. Own calculations. 
Note: *PMA is the age of a person in year x who has the same remaining life 
expectancy as a person at the median age in the year under consideration (i.e. the 
standard year), which in this example is 1950. 
Crucially, however, a second aspect of population age structure is changed by 
rising life expectancy. This aspect has not received as much attention, perhaps 
because it is technically more difficult to measure. It is the change in the 
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structure of the population in terms of its members’ years left to live. Longer 
lives mean that the same age in chronological years comes to be associated 
with longer remaining life expectancy. Many behaviours (including e.g. 
propensity to save, likelihood of consuming health services) and attitudes may 
be more strongly linked to remaining life expectancy than to age1. As mortality 
falls, it affects not only the structure of the years of life already lived by 
members of a population (what we’ve just looked at), but also the expected 
number of years left to live at a particular age (called prospective age by 
Sanderson and Scherbov, 2007). One can think of falls in mortality, especially 
at older ages, as the slowing down of senescence, or of biological ageing. If we 
use chronological age, we tend to imagine that people of the same age in 
different historical periods would behave in a similar ways. However, it would 
be wrong to assume that a 65-year-old person in 1909 was just as ‘old’ as a 65-
year-old person in 2009 even though both have lived the same number of years. 
This is because the two are unlikely to have aged at the same rate (Lutz et al. 
2008): a 65-year-old today has on average more remaining years of life than 
their counterparts of earlier times. For example, in 1909 a 65 year old male still 
had on average 10,7 years to live and a female 12,0. In 2009 this had increased 
to 16,7 and 19,3 years, respectively (www.mortality.org).  
This increase in life expectancy at age 65 of about 60% has shifted the meaning 
of given calendar ages substantially. As Table 2 shows, today’s 68 year-old 
male is literally the new 60 year-old given the identical remaining 15 years of 
life expectancy that 60 year olds had in 1976 (for women 71 year olds are the 
new 66 year olds). Not only are elderly living longer, they are also on average 
healthier (Lutz and Scherbov, 2005). We now live in an age of ‘active ageing’ 
with increasing amount of leisure (e.g. travelling, physical exercise) and non-
                                                          
1
 Here we refer to the average life expectancy of a population, not the life expectancy 
of individuals as the Human Mortality Database does not dispose of such information. 
Moreover, contrary to lived years, the exact date of one’s own death is unknown which 
would make certain (e.g. consumer) behaviour more likely to be influenced by 
population average life expectancy. Indeed, research on older individuals’ subjective 
probabilities of survival has been shown to be positively correlated with observed 
probabilities, despite cross-country and socioeconomic differences (Delavande and 
Rohwedder, 2011).  
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leisure (e.g. taking care of grandchildren while their own children work) 
activities being done by elderly citizens2.  
Table 2 
Scotland: Ages at which life expectancy equals 15 years  
Year Remaining years of 
life expectancy 
Approximately at age 
 Men Women 
    
1909 15 57 60 
1976 15 60 66 
2009 15 68 71 
Source: Human Mortality Database. www.mortality.org. Own calculations. 
Sanderson and Scherbov (2005, 2007) have thus suggested examining the 
prospective median ages (PMA) of populations and their members. ‘Life 
expectancy at the median age is the expected number of years to be lived by a 
person at the median age. It is also the median remaining life expectancy in the 
population, with half of the people being at ages with lower remaining life 
expectancies and half at ages with higher ones.’ (2005: 811). 
PMA are especially useful because they give a better guide to changes in 
society directly linked to the ageing of individuals. A well-known example is 
the concentration of medical expenditure in the final years of a person’s life. 
Trends in such expenditure in a population will be captured better by shifts in 
the prospective median age. They may not be captured at all by shifts in the 
median age, or by counting what proportion of the population lies over a given 
calendar age threshold, because this fails to take account, paradoxically, of the 
                                                          
2
 In the case of Great Britain, data show that both life expectancy and disability free 
life expectancy (DFLE), taken as life expectancy free from limiting long-standing 
illness, at age 65, have both increased since the mid-1970s. However, while the pattern 
of the former has been almost linear, the trend in DFLE was less so. Faster 
improvements since about 2000, however, have meant that in 2008-10 DFLE was at 
59% and 55% of male life expectancy at age 65 for men and women, respectively, 
compared to 55% and 52% in 1976 (own calculations based on figures published in 
Bebbington (1988) and ONS (2004; 2012)). 
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effect of longer life expectancy on behaviour. For example it is possible for 
rises in life expectancy to keep pace with or even outstrip rises in the median 
age of a population, such that both the median age and the prospective median 
age may rise: the population may be ‘older’ in the traditional sense of a having 
a higher average age, but thanks to gains in life expectancy, it will not have 
‘aged’ at all, or may even have become ‘younger’ in terms of average years 
remaining till death. This is not only possible, it is in fact an excellent 
description of what happened in Scotland between the late 1950s and the late 
1970s (see Table 1 and Figure 4). 
Figure 4 
Median Age vs. Prospective Median Age. Scotland 1950-2009. 
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Source: Human Mortality Database. www.mortality.org. Own calculations.  
Note: PMA 1950, etc. Year refers to Standard Year.  
In order to examine this process, it becomes convenient to standardize the 
median age using the life tables for a country in a given year (estimates differ 
little for period and cohort tables, enabling the former to be used). The 
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prospective median age proposed by Sanderson and Scherbov (2007) adjusts 
historical median ages to the age they would become if the remaining life 
expectancy at that age was that of the median age in the standard year. Such 
standardization allows us to compare calendar ages in different periods from 
the perspective of years left to live, rather than years already lived. The 
Prospective Median Age of a population in year X (called the index year), is 
the age of a person in index year X, who has the same remaining life 
expectancy as a person of the median age in another year chosen as the 
standard year. The PMA measure thus adjusts for changes in life expectancy 
over time. 
Both Table 1 and Figure 4 show the results for Scotland. If we consider 1950 
as the standard year then by definition both the median age and the prospective 
median age of the Scottish population are the same in this year (32.6 years), 
whereby life expectancy for someone of median age in 1950 was 38.6 years. 
Over the three decades, the median age hardly changed, although life 
expectancy at median age did. As a result, the prospective median age 
compared to 1950 declined. As we know, the median age increased sharply 
after 1980 to 40,8 years in 2009. At the same time, life expectancy at the 
annually higher median ages only declined slowly, with the net effect that the 
PMA increased to levels similar to 1950 (32.0 vs. 32.6 years). Although over 
the period of almost six decades the median age of the Scottish population 
increased by 8.5 years, the remaining life expectancy of persons of median age 
in both years is similar.  
As Figure 4 shows, the same trends are observed if different standard years are 
used, although the absolute level is different (i.e. as the MA is different for that 
year). For instance, if using 1980 as the standard year both the MA and PMA 
would equal 33.2 years in that year and the PMA 35.7 years in 1950 and 35.1 
in 2009, i.e. also 0.6 years lower in 2009 than in 1950 just as was the case 
when 1950 (or any other year) was used as the standard year. 
Because of the complex character of the formula used to produce prospective 
median ages, some readers may well suspect that we have employed some 
statistical sleight of hand to produce results that are not only counter-intuitive 
but run against the grain of existing comment. On the contrary, what we have 
suggested here is a way of measuring population ageing that, unlike the 
standard approach, is not blind to its inherently contradictory nature. We have 
more older people because people are living longer. Because they are living 
longer, their life expectancies are greater and with that the health, behaviour 
and attitudes of people of the same chronological age come to change over 
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time. Using the earlier example, a Scot of the median age 41 in 2009 had pretty 
much the same life expectancy as that of someone nine years younger, 32, in 
1950.  
As noted above, the median age in Scotland rose rapidly from 33 to 41 years 
between 1979 and 2009. From the one-sided perspective of calendar ages, this 
appears to be rapid population ageing with dramatic social consequences. 
However, if we also consider prospective median age, using the concept of 
standardizing for life expectancies in different years, we find a quite different 
story. In terms of standardized remaining years of life the change in median age 
has been barely two years. Moreover, this period has been an exceptional one, 
comprising as it does the years of adjustment after the baby boom, when high 
fertility kept the median age of the Scottish population down, offsetting all falls 
in mortality. Thus if we take a longer time period – sixty years rather than 
thirty – we find that in terms of expected years left to live, the Scottish 
population in 2009 was as ‘young’ as it was in 1950.  
THE CHALLENGES OF POPULATION AGEING RECONSIDERED 
However beneficial the longer lifespans that population ageing brings might be, 
they may nevertheless pose new challenges and problems for society. Here too 
we are unimpressed by much of the arguments and evidence cited briefly 
above. Let us take the six points we set out in our introduction in reverse order.  
Our consideration of prospective ages takes care of the last point about the 
inevitability of population ageing. Insofar as the reduction of mortality also 
entails what might be called the ‘juvenation’ of the population at any given age, 
it is not clear that longer lives necessarily are or will be ‘older’ ones. 
The fifth point, about the shift of political interests towards the older 
population has been true since the advent of universal suffrage. Alva Myrdal, 
the intellectual mother of the Scandinavian welfare state, pointed it out in her 
1941 book Nation and Family. Politics has always displayed a bias towards the 
interests of the old, for the simple reason that the majority of the electorate has 
still to reach old age, while the entire electorate has already been young. Thus 
in most democracies more attention is paid to elder than child poverty. The 
former tend to be seen as worthy recipients who have earned their right to state 
support or a light taxation touch. Witness the recent debate over death duties. 
Poor children, on the contrary, are too often seen as the unfortunate product of 
feckless parents. However, population ageing in itself need not worsen this 
Scottish Affairs 
64 
bias. It does so only to the extent that voters are encouraged to see themselves, 
and identify their interests with, ‘the old’ as defined by fixed calendar age 
thresholds. 
If we accept these arguments, then so too does the force of the fourth claim for 
the problematic effects of population ageing fail. Metaphors of ‘new blood’, 
and the association of dynamism with youthful vigour, are fine for literature but 
find scant support in rigorous empirical investigation, since ‘new blood’ may 
also be associated with relative ignorance, naivety and lack of either 
experience, diligence or loyalty. One could just as well reverse the argument 
about age and productivity. Think of the vast burden facing education and 
employment systems in the 1960s as they trained the army of baby-boom 
children. One might imagine that longer working lives allow for the greater 
accumulation of human and social capital. However, if people choose to reduce 
the proportion of their lives devoted to employment (as they have been doing 
in various ways since the time of the industrial revolution onwards) it is at least 
incumbent on the prophets of population ageing doom to explain why this 
should have become a qualitatively different problem now. Such choices have 
been made possible by the substantial and steady trend rise in standards of 
living ultimately driven by technological progress. Where is the evidence that 
this is about to stop? On the contrary, we seem to be enjoying successive waves 
of innovation driven by the relentless increase in microchip processing power.  
The cost of health and social care systems is certainly rising, as advocates of 
point 3 emphasize. However, the increasing cost of health and social care 
systems is in part yet another aspect of continued economic and technological 
progress which creates new possibilities for medical intervention or social 
protection. Moreover, medical and social care are examples of ‘technologically 
non-progressive’ activities (Baumol 1967), that also rely heavily on personal 
care work which cannot easily be automated. One might therefore expect a 
trend rise in their relative cost as technological innovation elsewhere in the 
economy raises the general productivity of labour and rewards to it, even if the 
level and nature of provision of health and social cares services did not change 
at all. What is less clear is whether the changing age structure of the population 
has a significant role to play in this process. People are living longer in part 
because they are healthier. One might think in terms of the slowing down of 
biological ageing or senescence. Several studies have suggested expenditure on 
health and social care continues to be concentrated in the final years of life 
(e.g. Seshamani & Gray, 2004; Wong et al., 2011; Zweifel et al., 1999). As life 
expectancy increases this expenditure is postponed to higher ages. Old age 
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should therefore not be a static but a dynamic concept and be measured as 
such. For instance, Sanderson and Scherbov (2008: 7) define old age as 
beginning when people have a remaining life expectancy of 15 or fewer years. 
As Table 2 showed earlier, the age at which men and women today have a life 
expectancy of 15 years is 68 for men and 71 for women.  
Old age dependency ratios have usually been calculated by simply dividing the 
number of people above a certain chronological age (such as the state 
retirement age) by the number who are currently of working age (typically 
taken as 16 to 64 for men). However this method of calculating dependency 
ratios gives us little sense of the impact of population ageing on the real 
balance of dependency, given that it focuses exclusively on the first only of the 
two contradictory effects of population ageing – the production of more older 
people – but older people who are themselves ‘younger’ than their peers of 
earlier years. This is shown in Figure 5. The dashed line in this graph uses 
Sanderson and Scherbov’s definition to expresses the proportion of the Scottish 
population who have less than 15 years of remaining life expectancy as a 
proportion of all the Scottish population who have higher life expectancies but 
are aged 20 or over. This gives us an alternative measure of the changing 
relative size of the potentially active and potentially old age dependent 
population. It takes no account of changing retirement ages, and takes 20 as a 
lower age limit for the active population, in order to reflect the rise in age at 
entry to the labour market over the last few decades. The solid line traces the 
classic ‘elderly dependency ratio’ calculated on the size of the population aged 
65+ relative to the ‘working age’ population of 16-64. The contrast in the 
evolution of the two measures could not be clearer. The first measure peaked in 
the late 1970s. Since then improvements in life expectancy have meant that the 
population with more than 15 years left to live has grown faster than those with 
less than 15 years. Indeed the size of the latter group as a proportion of the 
former has fallen from around one quarter to around one sixth. Conversely the 
classic elderly dependency ratio has steadily increased over the same period. 
Using a static age cut off point such as 65 in the planning of public expenditure 
on social resources, particularly related to health, makes little sense as 
population health at any given age improves over time. 
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Figure 5 
Standard Population Dependency Ratio vs. Life Expectancy Adjusted Population 
Dependency Ratio, 1950-2009 
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Source: Human Mortality Database. www.mortality.org. Own calculations. 
This leaves us with the first and perhaps most important argument: the decline 
in the number of productive workers compared to dependent citizens. This, 
surely, must be inevitable? It is no such thing. First, the size of the employed 
workforce is driven by many factors other than age: its relationship to the 
population age structure is rather dynamic. The employment rate of women and 
especially mothers increased dramatically over the last 50 years as systematic 
gender discrimination was dismantled in the workplace and the ‘male 
breadwinner’ employment system weakened (Figure 6). The ratio of productive 
workers to dependent citizens was moved upwards by the reduction in the 
number of young people in the population as fertility declined after the baby 
boom. However it was also driven down by the shortening of workers’ labour 
market careers. The skill demands of a high technology economy have 
increased the age of entry to the labour market. By the end of the 20th century 
young people were more likely to enter it in their early or mid-20s than at 16 or 
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17. At the same time less than one half of men and women were waiting until 
the state retirement age to leave the labour market. More did so earlier either 
because they could afford to do so, or because they no longer saw any realistic 
prospect of obtaining employment.  
Figure 6 
Economic Activity rates by gender and age group, Scotland 1981 and 2010* 
 
Source: Scotland Census 1981; Annual Population Survey (APS) July 2008 to June 
2012. 
* The average of four calendar years has been taken for the APS measurements, to give 
estimates for older years less influenced by sample fluctuation. 
Again, it is worth considering general economic and technological progress. 
Affluence and technological innovation ought surely to lead to a gradual 
reduction in the proportion of one’s time over the life course dedicated to 
employment. The 20th century saw the rise of the eight-hour day and the five-
day week and a substantial reduction in the working year (through increased 
holiday entitlement). For men it saw a reduction in the length of a labour 
market career (as age at entry increased and age at exit declined) while for 
women it increased as women ceased to exit the labour market after childbirth 
or marriage. A good indication of this is trends in annual working hours, since 
these not only take account of changes in the working day or week, but also 
changes in the length and number of holidays. Separate figures for Scotland are 
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not available, but OECD data for the UK show that, between 1870 and 1998, 
annual working hours per person employed fell by just over one half, from just 
under 3,000 hours to just under 1,500 hours per year. Over the same period 
productivity per person hour increased almost eleven fold (Maddison, 2006: 
347-9) In the future we could expect productivity gains to produce a continued 
reduction in the proportion of years in a person’s life devoted to employment in 
much the same way that they have produced a steady reduction in the amount 
of time within each year workers spend in employment. All this is progress. 
Dependency ratios are often seen as a negative thing: the higher the ratio of 
dependents to productive workers, the greater the problems for an economy. 
The term dependency ratio also encourages us to imagine that all people in 
employment are ‘productive’ while those not working are dependent upon 
them. It is far from clear that either proposition is true. The daily and 
generational reproduction of the employed labour force is almost entirely 
‘dependent’ upon the non-employed. Market society has hitherto failed to 
professionalize the family. Those in education and training may be counted as 
‘dependent’, but the economy is thoroughly dependent on the knowledge and 
expertise they thus acquire. It also needs them, of course, as consumers. Here 
too the position of the young and old are very different, since the old, on 
average, may be income poor, but are often asset rich. Thus the ‘grey pound’ 
has become steadily more important in modern economies.  
Possibly the worst way to calculate dependency ratios, given these factors, is 
the current standard practice: divide the number of people who have reached 
the state pension age (65 for men, between 60 and 62 for women) by those of 
‘working age’. This takes no account of the changing proportion of people of 
‘working age’ who are not in employment, nor, conversely, of the small but 
significant proportion of people who work well beyond the state pension age. 
The misleading results of doing so are indicated in Table 3 and Figure 7, which 
disaggregate the productive and dependents by sex and age for Scotland for the 
period 2008-2012. Just under half the total population, or 2.47 million people 
are ‘productive’ in the sense of being employed or self employed. Children 
under 16 number just over 0.9 million. The 1.8 million other dependents are 
divided almost equally between those of working age and those who are older. 
We draw two conclusions from this data. The first is that old age is a poor 
guide to dependency when one half of adult dependents are below the state 
pension age: it makes more sense to calculate ratios based directly on 
employment status. The second is that if there is concern about dependency 
ratios it ought to focus on all adults, rather than the elderly. Fuller employment, 
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regardless of workers’ ages, is the issue, not the age at which people choose to 
retire. 
Table 3 
Employment and Dependence by sex and age, Scotland 2008-12 (000s) 
Age 
Working 
Men 
Working 
Women 
Dependent 
Men 
Dependent 
Women 
0-15 0 0 465 444 
16-54 1053 1000 298 399 
55-59 118 109 41 57 
60-64 82 53 74 113 
65-69 22 16 99 119 
70-74 8 5 90 112 
75+ 3 2 143 224 
All 1286 1185 1209 1467 
Source: Annual Population Survey 2008-12 (annual average) 
This does not mean that population ageing poses no problems for the future in 
Scotland. Figure 2 shows that the population bulge associated with the baby 
boomers, who are now in their late forties or early fifties, will start to inflate 
the numbers of dependent elderly relative to the rest of the population in 
around twenty years time. However, we need to keep in mind that as with any 
birth cohort, the distribution of life expectancies and age related disabilities for 
these boomers dramatically dampens the effect upon health and social care 
systems. Some have already met precocious deaths, others will live to 
advanced years with little impairment.  
Just as in the past, care for older people will require resources to ensure that in 
both rural and urban areas there is more suitable retirement housing (Shelter, 
2012) and more health, social and other support services that are better adapted 
to their needs (Burnside, 2012; The Select Committee on Public Service and 
Demographic Change, 2013). Particularly the (less accessible) rural areas need 
careful planning given their higher proportion of elderly and a much lower 
population density. Already older rural people find a wide range of services 
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less convenient than their urban counterparts, and the question of rural services 
for dementia also appears to be a neglected theme (Blackstock et al. 2006). 
Ageing also affects certain subpopulations differently: for instance elderly who 
do not live with a partner or near offspring are more likely to rely on 
institutions for care, while the wealthy are more able to finance their own care. 
It has not been our aim here to explore the distribution of mortality by 
partnership status, social class, residential area or other characteristics. These 
are vital questions, but we leave them for future research. Our aim here has 
rather been to establish a clear idea of the volume of population ageing and 
how it might best be measured. 
Figure 7 
Employment and Dependence by sex and age, Scotland 2008-12 
 
Source: Annual Population Survey 2008-12 (annual average) 
The argument that population ageing as such must pose a fiscal challenge to the 
Scottish government that it will struggle to answer lacks empirical credibility 
as both our employment and demographic data suggest. Like Shaw (2008) we 
see no reason why the lengthening lifespans produced by ‘population ageing’ 
Population Ageing in Scotland: Time for a Re-think? 
 71
 
pose any challenge to the economy of the kind that routine productivity growth 
has met in the past and will continue to meet in the future. Productivity growth 
will continue to outstrip the gradual increase in the proportion of the 
population who have finished their working lives. We suspect that the age at 
which they choose to do so in the future will continue to be driven by factors 
other than the state pension age, just as the age at which youngsters enter the 
labour force has been determined less by changes in school leaving age than by 
the educational qualifications demanded by a high technology economy. While 
few could argue with the right of older people to continue working if that is 
their choice, constraining that choice by raising the state pension age seems to 
us to have more to do with attempts to downsize the welfare state than address 
a proven demographic crisis.  
CONCLUSIONS 
From our analysis we draw three conclusions. We reject claims about the 
sustainability of current pension, welfare, social or healthcare arrangements 
which are based on examining misleading indicators such as the proportion of 
the population aged 65+ or dependency ratios calculated using static 
population age structures. It is better to examining real trends in employment 
or other behaviour. Such claims are more likely to spring from a desire to 
restrict the volume of state activity than a desire to truly understand the 
dynamics of population aging.  
Second, social scientists and social commentators have a responsibility to 
choose the metaphors they use with care. The overwhelmingly negative ones 
chosen to describe the global, continuing fall in mortality have facilitated the 
perception that the latter has been chiefly a threat to existing social 
arrangements rather than a fundamental achievement of social progress. 
Finally, too little attention has been given by economists, sociologists, 
demographers and others to the implications of rapidly increasing life 
expectancy for the relationship between age and behaviour. In this case at least, 
vernacular slang, with its talk of ‘50 is the new 40’, has perhaps been some 
way ahead of the ‘experts’. 
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